This paper employs a natural experiment from …nancial history to study the process by which private information is incorporated into prices. I look at the market for English securities in Theory o¤ers two perspectives. According to one view, agents with private information act in a competitive fashion. They do not take their impact on prices into consideration. They trade right after they receive a private signal and they do so aggressively. As a result, the privately-informed immediately reveal (most or all) of their private information. 2 According to the second view, insiders are strategic and take the price impact of their trades into account. They internalize that their pro…ts fall as prices become more informative. This constrains their behavior. Trades are spread out over time. Price discovery -the process by which private information is incorporated into pricesis prolonged (Kyle 1985) . 3 Strategic behavior is not a su¢ cient condition for slow price discovery.
The identi…cation relies on the communication technology of the time. In the 18 th century people relied on sailing ships to transmit news across the North Sea (Neal 1990; Koudijs 2012 ; see …gure 2 for a map). There was an o¢ cial mail packet boat service that carried both public newspapers and private letters. For all practical purposes this was the only way in which public and private information got transmitted from London to Amsterdam. 4 On average these sailing boats arrived twice a week, but due to adverse wind conditions at sea this could vary considerably.
I study the process of price discovery in the following way. Under the null hypothesis all public information was immediately incorporated into prices. If there was private information as well, this was held by competitive insiders. Depending on whether these insiders were risk neutral or risk averse this information was either fully or partly incorporated into prices. In both cases insiders traded immediately on the information and prices moved only once in response (see footnote 2 on page 2). If the Amsterdam market responded to this information e¢ ciently, Amsterdam prices immediately re ‡ected the London information after a boat arrival. Any other price movements in
Amsterdam between the arrival of two boats should be unrelated to developments in London.
Under the alternative hypothesis private information in London was held by strategic agents.
While public information was immediately incorporated into prices, private information was not.
London insiders traded strategically and price discovery was spread out over time. The packet boats transported both public and private information. Amsterdam insiders observed the private information and, if they also traded strategically, price discovery in Amsterdam was spread out over time as well. 5 As a consequence, prices in Amsterdam not only responded to London on the days the packet boats came in. More generally they moved in the same direction as prices in London, re ‡ecting the incorporation of the same private signals. This intuition is illustrated by …gure 1.
[
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The data rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative. The co-movement patterns of prices in London and Amsterdam are consistent with slow price discovery and supports the original Kyle (1985) model in which privately informed agents trade strategically. There are two additional pieces of evidence that corroborate this conclusion. First of all, a Kyle-type model predicts that if insiders expect to have a lot of time to use their private signal, they will trade less aggressively early on. This ensures that their information is not revealed too quickly and they continue to make insider pro…ts in later periods (for a formalization of this intuition see section 2). This is con…rmed by the data. Based on the sailing schedule and local wind conditions I reconstruct when agents in
Amsterdam expected the next boat to arrive. This boat carried information from London (e.g. prices)
that (partly) revealed the insiders'signals. Consistent with the theory, the initial co-movement of Amsterdam and London prices was weaker when the next boat was expected to arrive late and there were more opportunities to trade on his signal.
Second, if prices in Amsterdam re ‡ected the incorporation of private information, then the London market could have learned from Amsterdam prices. 6 This is con…rmed by the data. Conditional on its own price discovery, the London market updated its beliefs based on price changes in Amsterdam.
If due to weather conditions it took longer for a private signal to "bounce o¤" from Amsterdam, the London market responded less. When a roundtrip London-Amsterdam took longer than two weeks, feedback from Amsterdam became irrelevant. At that point the initial private signal was already fully incorporated into London prices and the Amsterdam signal became irrelevant.
I test for a number of alternative explanations. First of all, the co-movement of Amsterdam and London prices might be explained by public information that was only slowly incorporated into prices. This could be due to signi…cant trading costs (or limits to arbitrage) that prevented prices from immediately adjusting to news. In one interpretation, this would lead to momentum in the return series (see Hong and Stein 2001) . Although there is some evidence for return continuation, this does not drive the results. 7 In another interpretation prices may not adjust at all because of trading costs (Lesmond et al. 1999; Bekaert et al. 2007) . Price adjustment only takes place when the news shock is big enough or when trading costs are low. I show that co-movement between
Amsterdam and London was slightly stronger after zero returns in London. However, this does not drive the results.
Secondly, the co-movement between Amsterdam and London could be driven by correlated liquidity shocks rather than by private information. As liquidity traders move down (potentially) downward sloping demand curves in both markets, prices move in the same direction. It is natural to assume that liquidity shocks have a transitory impact on prices (Grossman and Miller 1988) . In other words, liquidity shocks should lead to return reversals. If this drove the co-movement between Amsterdam
and London, then we should observe return reversals across markets. I.e. positive (negative) price changes in London should predict subsequent negative (positive) returns in Amsterdam. This is not the case.
Finally, co-movement might simply be driven by news slipping through other channels than the o¢ cial packet boat service. There is no qualitative evidence that market participants relied on sources other than the o¢ cial mail service. The most important Anglo-Dutch bank of the period that was active in the stock market (Hope & Co) fully relied on the o¢ cial mail. Nevertheless it is possible that other market participants used alternative ways to transmit information, speci…cally other sailing boats. To test for this possibility I restrict the sample to periods where, after the arrival of a packet boat, wind conditions suddenly turned so that future packet boats were signi…cantly delayed. I assume that during these periods it was equally impossible for other boats to sail across 6 This is true as long as noise trading shocks were not perfectly correlated across markets. If this condition is met, price discovery in two markets is more informative than in one (Chowdry and Nanda 1991; Boulatov et al. 2011). 7 Note that the discovery of private information in a Kyle model (or any type of REE model) does not lead to momentum. The intuition behind this is that in a REE, future price changes should not be predictable based on past returns (see section 2 and Banerjee et al. 2009 ).
the North Sea. If co-movement was purely driven by news arriving through other channels, prices
should not move in the same direction in London and Amsterdam during these episodes. I …nd that co-movement was present and just as strong during periods of adverse wind conditions. This does not disprove that channels other than the packet boats were used. However it does indicate that private information is needed to fully explain the co-movement patterns in the data.
Note that none of these three alternative explanations can explain why co-movement was stronger (weaker) if the next boat was expected to arrive early (late). Nor can they account for the conditional feedback e¤ect of Amsterdam price changes on London. Without a Kyle model, it is di¢ cult to make sense of these …ndings.
This paper is related to two strands in the existing literature. First of all, there is a large body of empirical literature that documents the importance of private information for asset price movements.
Most empirical work interprets the price impact of transactions (or order ‡ow imbalance) as evidence for the relevance of private information (Hasbrouck 1991; Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara 1997; Madhavan et al. 1997; Evans and Lyons 2002; Vega 2006 and related papers) . Recently this interpretation has attracted some criticism because the price impact of order ‡ow imbalance can capture liquidity as well as information (Duarte and Young 2009 ). There have been alternative approaches to study the impact of private information. For example, Pasquariella and Vega (2007) and Tetlock (2010) look at the interaction of order ‡ow imbalance (or volume) and public information events. Marin and Olivier (2008) …nd that stock prices drop sharply after (reported) insider sales peak. Cohen et al. (2008; 2010) focus on the performance of institutional investors in stocks of companies that are run by former class mates. Cohen et al. (2011) analyze reported insider trades and show that non-predictable trades outperform the market. Kelly and Ljunqvist (2011) look at the impact of the closure of brokerage …rms'research departments. The present paper complements these …ndings and provides further evidence for the relevance of private information. The key strength of this paper is that 18 th century …nancial markets were less complex than today and that information ‡ows can be perfectly reconstructed. This allows for a clean identi…cation of private information.
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Most importantly, this paper is related to the questions whether insiders are competitive or strategic and, related to this, how quickly private information is incorporated into prices (for theoretical contributions see for example Kyle 1985; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Subrahmanyam 1991; Back 1992; Subrahmanyam 1992, 1994; Viswanathan 1994, 1996; Romer 1993; Chau and Vayanos 2008; Caldentey and Stacchetti 2010) . Because private information is by de…ni-tion unobservable, there is only limited empirical evidence available to answer these questions. Most evidence is indirect and based on intra-daily volatility and volume patterns (see inter alia Madhavan et al. 1997; Dahya et al. 2010) . Notable exceptions are Boulatov et al. (2011) Relative to this literature I make the following contributions. First of all, the paper provides direct evidence that insiders acted strategically and traded di¤erently depending on the time they expected to have to bene…t from their private information. This signi…cantly a¤ected the speed of price discovery (Caldentey and Stacchetti 2010) . Secondly, the paper …nds that private information is slowly incorporated into prices, con…rming the predictions of Kyle (1985) and related contributions.
I estimate that it took approximately two weeks for a given private signal to be incorporated into prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the historical background and context of this paper in more detail. In addition, I provide anecdotal evidence for the relevance of private information. To motivate the empirical analysis I set up a simple Kyle model in section 2.
Section 3 presents empirical evidence that supports the model's predictions. Section 4 provides a number of robustness checks and extensions. Section 5 concludes.
Historical background
In separate work (Koudijs 2012 , see also Neal 1990 ) I provide a more detailed overview of the market for English stocks in Amsterdam in the 1770s and 1780s. In this section I summarize this historical background and I give ample attention to the microstructure of this market.
Stock and sample period
The data necessary for this paper's analysis are available for three di¤erent English securities, British East India Company (EIC) stock, Bank of England (BoE) stock and a government bond, the 3% Annuities. 9 The empirical analysis in the main text focuses on the EIC. Results for the other two securities, which are overall very similar, are presented in Appendix B. The EIC was a trading company that held large possessions in today's India. The company's prospects were to a large extent determined by conditions in India. However, during the second half of the 18 th century political developments in England started to become of key importance. 10 (Sutherland 1952) . The BoE operated to help …nance the British government debt. The BoE was set up in 1694 to function as the government's banker. In addition, the BoE also provided large scale credit to the EIC. Finally, it discounted commercial bills, but on a relatively modest scale (Clapham 1944) . 9 In addition to these three securities, South Sea Company stock and 4% Annuities were also widely traded in
Amsterdam. However, there is no frequent price data for London available for these securities. 10 There was a constant discussion inside and outside the British Parliament about the semi-private character of the company and its public function. In addition, the company required regular bailouts from the English government to stay on its feet. As a result, political gyrations had an important impact on the company's share price
The analysis of this paper rests on the assumption that all relevant information about the English securities was generated in England. This is not necessarily true for the entire 18 th century (see Dempster et al. 2000) . The period was …lled with European continental wars or the threat of a war breaking out, and England was involved in nearly all of them (Neal 1990 
The ‡ow of information between London and Amsterdam
How exactly did English news reach Amsterdam? England and the Dutch Republic were connected through a system of sailing ships, at the time referred to as packet boats. The system was organized between Harwich and Hellevoetsluys, a important harbor close to Rotterdam (see …gure 2). Since
Amsterdam did not have a direct connection with the North Sea, this was the fastest way information from London could reach Amsterdam (Hemmeon 1912; Ten Brink 1957 , 1969 Hogesteeger 1989; OSA 2599 ).
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Each packet boat brought in newspapers and other public newsletters with information about the recent developments in London, including the most recent stock prices. In addition, the packet boats brought in private letters. These could be simple letters from London correspondents with political and economic news and updates about stock market conditions 12 . They could also be private letters from London insiders to their agents in Amsterdam; the focus of this paper.
The packet boats were scheduled to leave on …xed days: Wednesday and Saturday. The median sailing time was 2 days (including the day of departure). It took additional time to transport the news over land. Roads were particularly bad during the period and rivers had to be crossed by 11 The starting point of the …rst period, September 1771, is determined by data limitations. ferry. Even though the news was transported on horseback, this still took considerable time, adding two days, making a total of 4 days (including the day of departure). With a total of nine times this happened only infrequently during the entire sample period. These episodes were meticulously reported by the Dutch newspapers and I account for them in the empirical analysis.
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The packet boats were of course not the only ships that sailed between London and Amsterdam. 13 In London news would be collected by the end of the day on Tuesday or Friday (day of departure: day 1). This was transported to Harwich in the early morning, from where a mail packet boat would set sail in the afternoon (day 2). The boat would usually arrive in Hellevoetsluys on the next day (day 3). After the news had arrived it was quickly sent to Amsterdam where it usually arrived the day after (day 4). 14 Most English letters in the Hope archive mention both the date a letter was written in London and the date it was received and opened in Amsterdam. I found 112 letters that Hope received from London during the sample periods.
99 of these letters were dated on mail days and were written right before the next mail boat would leave. Each week ships coming from England would dock in the Amsterdam harbor. However in terms of keeping up with current a¤airs these ships were always behind the packet boats. Amsterdam had no direct connection to the North Sea and boats had to sail via the isle of Texel to enter Amsterdam from the east. This would take a number of additional days. It therefore comes as no surprise that both individuals and the public newspapers had to rely on the packet boat service to get the most recent news from London.
Although the packet boat service seems to have been the most important source of information for Dutch investors, the ‡ow of news through alternative channels can never be completely ruled out.
It is possible that investors set up private initiatives to get information from London. For example, market participants may have used carrier pigeons to get information from London. The use of pigeons can be retraced to antiquity. However the historical record suggests that people only started using them intensively after 1800 (Levi 1977 
Market microstructure
During the 18 th century the stock trade in Amsterdam took place in a decentralized fashion. Around noon there were two o¢ cial trading hours in front of the Exchange building (Spooner 1983; Hoes 1986 ). However, trade continued outside these o¢ cial hours in co¤ee shops and even in front of the Jewish synagogue (many traders were Jewish). Trading seems to have continued into the evening. A central clearing mechanism for the stock trade was missing and most trades took place through the direct matching of buying and selling parties (Van Nierop 1931) .
This matching was done by a relatively small group of brokerage …rms. Smith (1919) argues that in 1764, 41 brokerage …rms were dominating the market. The correspondence of broker Robert
Hennebo published in Van Nierop (1931) indicates that the market was driven by limit orders.
Principals would transmit these orders to their brokers, who then tried to execute these orders to the best of their ability. This has an interesting implication for the prices we observe. The prices that 16 There is a famous anecdote from 1815 where Nathan Rothschild received news about the outcome of the battle of Waterloo before anybody else by ways of a carrier pigeon. This story has been debunked as a myth (Ferguson 1998) .
His courier used a boat.
were reported most likely re ‡ected the equilibrium price at which most limit orders could be cleared.
The correspondence in Van Nierop (1931) suggests that prices were indeed interpreted this way.
By the second half of the 18 th century a signi…cant fraction of trade in the English stocks in
Amsterdam was concentrated in the futures market. This has the important implication that it was relatively easy for market participants to go short as well as long 17 .
Private information
There is Gerrit Blaauw traded for their account in the Amsterdam market (Sutherland 1952, pp. 206-8) .
The clearest example of informed trading in Amsterdam comes from the archives of Hope & Co.
In the fall of 1772 Hope went into business with Thomas Walpole to speculate on EIC stock. Walpole was a London banker but also the nephew of former Prime-Minister Robert Walpole, and a prominent Member of Parliament (Sutherland 1952, pp. 101 and 109) . Walpole was clearly a political insider. . One wouldn't go lower, for though it is probable the stock will fall to 150%, yet at that price or higher people may begin to speculate for the rise which will undoubtedly take place when any plan shall be …xed for the relief of the company. Whenever therefore the price falls to 154% or thereabouts, we should not only settle our positions but purchase more with a view to the rise as circumstances may make it advisable'.
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Walpole's intelligence proved to be accurate. On January 14, 1773 the Directors of the EIC asked for a government loan and concessions to export tea to all British colonies, both of which were granted (Sutherland 1952, pp. 249-251 Walpole shared the proceeds of this transaction 50/50, the pro…t from this short position is consistent with a price fall of -7.3 %-point (so for example from 165% to 157.7%).
Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on detailed price data from the Amsterdam and London markets and information about the arrival of packet boats in Hellevoetsluys (and Harwich Neal (1990) and Dempster et al. (2000) use Amsterdam prices with a frequency of 2 observations a month.
Sterling and prices were therefore reported in Pounds (as the percentage of nominal or face value).
The Amsterdam prices the Dutch papers published were supplied at the end of the afternoon by a committee of so-called sworn brokers who were o¢ cially responsible for reporting these prices (Smith 1919, p. 109; Polak (1924) ; Jonker 1996, p. 147) . Price data from London are available on a daily basis (Monday -Saturday) and are taken from Neal (1990) , where necessary supplemented with Rogers (1902) . Finally I use data on weather conditions from the observatory of Zwanenburg, a town close to Amsterdam (10 kms from the city centre). There are two or three observations a day on the wind direction and other weather variables. This data comes from KNMI.
Model
Under the null hypothesis all information, including private signals, is immediately incorporated into prices (see footnote 2 on page 2). Under the alternative hypothesis insiders trade strategically and private information is only slowly revealed. In this section I develop a simple Kyle (1985) The model features the trade of a single risky asset in two di¤erent markets, London (L) and Amsterdam (A). All relevant information originates in London. I fully abstract from public information (in the empirical setting it will be simple to reintroduce this) and focus on private signals.
The full model consists of an in…nite number of episodes, indexed with k. Each individual episode k is represented in …gure 3. At the beginning of episode k nature determines the true value of the asset v k , where v k is a random walk, i.e.
). " k is not known to the wider public but is privately observed by a single agent, the London insider, at the beginning of the episode. At the end of the episode, " k is publicly revealed in London and the next episode k + 1 begins.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The model is focussed on developments in Amsterdam. I assume that right after the moment nature decides on " k , before any trade takes place in London, the London insider sends this signal to a trusted agent in Amsterdam. This information arrives in Amsterdam at the beginning of period t = 1. When, at the end of the episode, " k is revealed, this information is also sent to Amsterdam immediately. Depending on the weather conditions, this news either arrives in Amsterdam relatively quickly after just one round of trade (referred to as t = 1), or it is delayed and only arrives after an additional round of trade (t = 2).
25 The probability of news arriving right after t = 1 is 1 k . The probability of it arriving after t = 2 is k . k is allowed to di¤er across episodes. The boat that leaves London after the episode has come to an end, fully reveals private signal " k . This means that after the arrival of the boat the informed agent looses his informational advantage. If news travels fast, there is therefore only one period to trade on private signal " k , whereas if news is delayed there are two periods. 26 Apart from k episodes are ex ante identical and I therefore drop subscript k.
Developments in Amsterdam are modeled as a two period Kyle (1985) model. There is a single risk neutral agent in Amsterdam who privately observes " before any trade takes place. The only change with respect to Kyle (1985) is the introduction of uncertainty about whether the informed agent will have a second period to trade in or not (compare Back and Baruch 2004 and Caldentey and Stacchetti 2010) . Period t = 2 only occurs with probability .
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In addition to the informed agent, there is a competitive risk neutral market maker and every trading period features noise trading. Speci…cally, in both periods liquidity traders will submit an exogenous trading demand u t with u t N 0; 2 ut . u 1 and u 2 are independent of each other and ". I allow the variance of the liquidity shock to di¤er between periods.
The informed agent submits a market order x t to the market maker. The market maker also 25 Period t = 1 of the model corresponds to periods in Amsterdam right after the arrival of a boat. Period t = 2 of the model corresponds to subsequent periods without news. 26 Note that the probability that a boat arrives after t = 1 or t = 2 also depends on the speed of the previous boat (the …rst solid line in …gure 3 pointing to t = 1). 27 It is possible to add more periods to the model. However, this adds little to the model's key intuition. In addition,
there are too few periods without news available in Amsterdam that are su¢ ciently long to estimate a multi-period model in the data.
receives the liquidity shock u t as a market order. The market maker cannot discriminate between x t and u t and only observes y t = x t + u t . The market maker is competitive and risk neutral and sets the price at which it processes orders at
There are no constraints on the position the market maker can take.
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As is standard in the literature I restrict the attention to linear equilibria.
Proposition 1 A unique linear equilibrium exists and has the following form:
Proof. see appendix A.
This equilibrium is very similar to the one in Kyle (1985) . The …rst key result is summarized by the following two corollaries (compare Chowdry and Nanda 1991).
28 Note that this speci…c market microstructure di¤ers from the historical setting. An alternative setup would be a stylized two period limit order market (with risk averse agents) in the vein of Kyle (1989) . However such a model adds signi…cant complications. Numerical analysis indicates that results are qualitatively unchanged. For simplicity, I therefore stick to the Kyle (1985) framework.
These corollaries state that price changes in Amsterdam in both periods t = 1 and t = 2 should be correlated with the private signal ". The monopolistic behavior of the insider leads to a slow revelation of the private signal. The insider takes his own price impact (Kyle's ) into account and this constrains his behavior. In other words, the equilibrium of t = 1 is not fully revealing and asymmetric information is persistent. As a result there is additional price discovery going on in t = 2.
Price changes in London after the departure of a boat should also be correlated with ". The private signal will be publicly announced in London by the time the next boat is set to depart for
Amsterdam. Before that happens the London insider trades on his private information and " will be (largely) revealed before the actual public announcement. In line with Kyle's results, there is no auto-correlation between price changes in Amsterdam in t = 1 and t = 2. The intuition comes from market e¢ ciency. If there is positive auto-correlation, the price change in t = 1 would not fully incorporate all relevant information. The market maker would be able to predict the price change in t = 2 based on the price change in t = 1. This would be inconsistent with risk neutral and competitive behavior.
The second key result is summarized by the following corollary
This corollary states that the co-movement between the price change in t = 1 and " should be decreasing in . The intuition for this result follows from the trade-o¤ the informed agent faces between pro…ts from trading in t = 1 and t = 2. If the insider only has one period available to trade on his private signal, he would balance the price impact of his trade (the more he trades, the bigger the price impact) with the volume of trades he can get executed. One speci…c price impact-volume combination maximizes pro…ts. If he gets a second period to trade, this optimal price impact-volume combination would change. The insider would now prefer to trade less in period t = 1 so that he reveals less of his private information and he can obtain more pro…ts in period t = 2. In the model period t = 2 only occurs with probability . If is high the insider would like to trade less aggressively in t = 1 to save informational advantage for t = 2. However if is small, the optimal strategy would be to trade more aggressively in t = 1. As a result, co-movement with " (and thus with London) will be stronger.
What drives the variation of ? First of all, is determined by the speed of the boat that publicly reveals " (see …gure 3). Second, it is also driven by the speed of the boat that initially transmitted " as a private signal. If this boat arrived relatively late to begin with, the (unconditional) probability of having two periods of trade is small.
There are a number of assumptions that merit further discussion. First of all, I assume that all private information is publicly revealed in London by the time the next boat sets its sails for
Amsterdam. This is a simpli…cation to make sure (1) there is only one private signal at a given point in time and (2) Finally, I assume that the insider is a monopolist. There may in fact be multiple insiders. The model's predictions should be the same as long as the di¤erent private signals are su¢ ciently heterogenous (Foster and Vishwanathan 1996) . If multiple agents observe the same private signal, competition between these agents would quickly undo the model's predictions (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1994 in London, as the same underlying private signal gets incorporated into prices in both cities. This should be true for both t = 1, the news period right after the arrival of a boat, and t = 2, the subsequent non-news period. Secondly, the model predicts that this co-movement with London in period t = 1 should be stronger if the next boat is expected to arrive relatively quickly.
To guide the empirical discussion, …gure 4 applies the model setup (…gure 3) to the empirical setting. There are two relevant boat crossings. The …rst crossing transmits private signal " k (and publicly reveals previous private signal " k 1 ). The second crossing reveals private signal " k (and brings in new private signal " k+1 ). With probability 1 k the second boat will arrive relatively quickly after the …rst, with probability k it will arrive relatively late.
[ This corresponds to period t = 2 of the model. Returns are calculated as log returns in percentages. ) should respond to this public news shock. I control for these public information shocks throughout the empirical analysis. The most impor- 31 The returns that are calculated for Friday to Monday (3 instead of 2 days) are not scaled down. The reason for not doing so that is that trading was restricted in the weekend. Jewish traders would not trade on the Sabbat, while Christians would not on Sundays (Spooner 1983) . As an approximation, I therefore treat the 3 day weekend return the same as the 2 day week returns. tant reason for doing so is that there might be momentum in the London return series that drives the co-movement between London and Amsterdam. Suppose that there are trading costs or limits to arbitrage that lead to a delayed response to public information and consequently to momentum (Hong and Stein 2001) . In that case, we would expect Amsterdam and London prices to move in the same direction even if there is no private information at all. Controlling for public news shocks should control for this. In one of the robustness checks I also consider the case where trading costs or limits to arbitrage lead to zero returns instead of momentum.
Re-introducing public information

Baseline results
How well do the corollaries established by the model hold up? I …rst consider the impact of insider trading and the resulting co-movement of London and Amsterdam returns. Corollaries 2 and 3 state that returns in Amsterdam, both right after the arrival of news from London and during subsequent periods without any news, should foreshadow developments in London that will take place right after the departure of the news to Amsterdam. Or in terms of …gure 4 both R 
Figures 5 and …gures 6 present these correlations graphically for EIC stock. [FIGURES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE]
In table 1 I estimate these correlations in a formal econometric framework, again for EIC stock.
I correlate R L k (again calculated over the three days after the departure of the boat) with R A k;t=1 and R A k;t=2 . I condition on the public news shock N k 1 . This measures the public news shock arriving in Amsterdam with the packet boat. Inclusion of this variable should correct for any momentum that might be present in the return series.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Results in table 1 suggest that the co-movement with London post-departure returns is especially strong for returns taking place right after the arrival of a boat from England. However, the di¤erence between the two coe¢ cients is not signi…cant at standard con…dence levels. In addition, the reverse 32 Note that returns are corrected for the public news shock N k 1 . To facilitate interpretation, the x-axes in …gures seems to be true for BoE stock and the 3% Annuities (see tables 7 and 8 in Appendix B), although di¤erences here are not statistically signi…cant either. It can be shown that the model has no strict predictions about this dimension; it all depends on the variance of the noise trading shocks in the two periods.
I perform two simple robustness tests. First of all, I calculate the London post-departure return R L k for di¤erent periods (2, 4 and 5 days after a boat departure). Results for EIC stock are presented in table 9 in Appendix B. Varying the period over which to calculate R L k does not matter substantially for the estimates. In addition, I exclude the …rst day of the London post-departure return to make sure that the positive co-movement between R L k and R A k;t=1 is not just driven by the fact that the boat carried slightly more recent public information than indicated by the data. Table 10 in Appendix B indicates that this is not the case.
Di¤erent expectations about the next boat arrival
Corollary 4 states that the co-movement with London in period t = 1 should be stronger if the next boat is expected to arrive relatively quickly. How well does this corollary hold up? This would provide direct evidence in favor of the strategic behavior of insiders.
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Before going into the empirical tests let me …rst discuss how I estimate the crucial parameter k .
This k is the probability that a second period of trade (t = 2) occurs within episode k (see …gure 4). I allow k to di¤er over time. To generate an empirical equivalent of k I estimate E [A]. This is the expected number of days until the arrival of the next boat. This expectation is constructed right after the arrival of the previous boat. The longer E [A], the more trading opportunities the informed agent has. I calculate this expectation in two ways.
To begin with, I take the median travelling time of a packet boat (4 days, including the day of departure) and add the number of days until the next departure from London is scheduled (or I subtract the number of days since departure if this has already happened). For example, suppose that a boat has just arrived and that the next boat is scheduled to depart from London one day later.
I add one day to the median travelling time to arrive at the expected time until the next boat arrival.
If this boat had left London one day earlier I subtract one day. This yields E [Ajsimple]. Two boats a week were set to sail between England and Holland, so the unconditionally expected number of days until the next arrival is 3.5. I di¤erentiate between E [Ajsimple] > 3:5 and E [Ajsimple] < 3:5.
As an alternative, I allow the expected travelling time to vary depending on weather conditions and the time of the year. This yields E [Ajextended]. Speci…cally I estimate a duration model with a ‡exible Gamma distribution that predicts travelling times. I condition on multiple factors. Most importantly, sailing boats had trouble crossing the North Sea from England to Holland when the 33 The model also holds predictions for co-movement in period t = 2. Speci…cally, we would expect to observe less co-movement if the insider initially expected the next boat to arrive right after t = 1. Unfortunately there are too few observations available to test this. It happens only infrequently that period t = 2 takes place unexpectedly.
wind was blowing from an eastern direction. When the sailing direction gets too close to the wind, sails cannot be adjusted anymore and a sailing boat enters the so-called no-go zone; see …gure 7. If the boat's direction lies within the no-go zone, it will have to tack or, in other words, it will constantly have to change direction. This slows down sailing and leads to a longer e¤ective distance. I have data available on wind directions from the observatory of Zwanenburg (close to Amsterdam) for 2 or 3 observations a day. For every observation I determine whether a sailing boat sailing east would face a no-go zone. For modern sailing boats this no-go zone lies around 30 to 50 degrees from the wind- 
The interaction e¤ect captures corollary 4. I use both E [Ajsimple] and E [Ajextended]. In both cases the interaction e¤ect is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 1 or 5% level. Economically the e¤ects are also signi…cant. Co-movement roughly doubles if the next boat is expected to arrive within 3.5 days. (Figures 17 to 20 in appendix B present these estimates graphically.) As expected 34 Hellevoetsluys was situated in the mouth of several rivers. Ice ‡oating downstream could make it hard to reach the harbor. A dummy for temperatures below 3 degrees Celcius has the best …t in the duration model. This is the case because inland tempartures were lower than the ones measured at the Zwanenburg observatory which was relatively close to the sea. 35 In unreported results I …nd that the volatility of stock prices in London does not signi…cantly di¤er across months.
This suggests that these month dummies do not capture a di¤erent underlying price process.
the interaction e¤ect is largest when E [Ajextended] is used. Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix B present these estimates for BoE stock and the 3% Annuities. Results are qualitatively similar. Table 2 calculates London returns over 3 days after the departure of a boat. In innovations in the price process (later on I will return to this assumption), price changes in Amsterdam and London can be written as
Again, assuming away any additional shocks, this implies that
Under the assumption that 0 < cov A ; L < var i ;equation 13 has three testable predictions. 
Proof. See appendix A. informative, then it is optimal to decrease the weight on that signal ( AjL ) more than proportionally. revealed. Longer periods a occur when news from London happens to arrive right after a boat has just set sail for England. At that point it will take at least 3 or 4 days for the next boat to sail out.
It is easy to see why
If weather conditions are such that boats cannot set sail for England, period a will take even longer.
In the same vein, if the time in London between the initial departure of the boat and the eventual arrival of news from Amsterdam (l) is long, then London prices are more informative. In this case
London prices probably reveal a large part of the private information. Longer periods l occur when a is long (creating a identi…cation problem, see discussion below), or when sailing times on the North Sea (in either direction) happened to be long.
To test these predictions I estimate the following regression, including interaction e¤ects between
Amsterdam returns and a and l to pick up the e¤ect of the two di¤erent signals'precision.
Predictions 1 and 3 imply that 1 > 0, 2 < 0, 3 > 0 and 4 < 0. Before turning to the regression results, let me …rst reiterate that I make an important assumption to arrive at (13) and (14), namely that no additional shocks a¤ect the price process. This is obviously not true. Price
may also include new private and public information shocks. In other words, I only observe L and A with an error. As a result there will be attenuation bias in estimating the regression coe¢ cients from (14). However, predictions 1-3 should still remain valid. Coe¢ cients (and di¤erences between coe¢ cients) should simply be smaller.
[ Consistent with prediction 2, this 1 increases with about 50% to 0:1 when the previous return in London is included in the estimation (a 1% increase in the Amsterdam price leads to a 0:1% increase in London prices). This di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. Consistent with prediction
) is negative and signi…cant. These results suggest that the London reaction to news from Amsterdam is not just simply related to some other fundamental shocks originating in Holland but is really the result of the feedback e¤ect of private information.
Colums 3 and 4 include the interaction e¤ects with a and l individually. Both a and l are introduced as deviations from the median. This means that coe¢ cient 1 is estimated at median values for a (3 days) and l (11 days). The interaction e¤ects measure the impact on 1 when moving away from this median. Neither interaction e¤ect, economically nor statistically, is signi…cant on its own. This is not unexpected. a and l are positively correlated (correlation of 0.73). The two hypothesized interaction e¤ects actually have opposite expected coe¢ cients ( 3 > 0 and 4 < 0).
Introduced individually, the coe¢ cients will be biased downwards. In column 5 they are introduced 36 The observations included in these regressions are constructed as follows (see …gure 10 for reference). jointly. In this speci…cation they do have statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients. The signs on the coe¢ cients are as predicted. A longer l leads to a smaller response of the London price to Amsterdam price changes. A longer a leads to a larger response.
The economic impact of the interaction e¤ects is considerable. The 90th percentile of the distribution of [a median(a)] is at 2 days. This means that moving from the median to the 90th percentile increases the response coe¢ cient from 0.111 to 0.245. The 10th percentile of the distribution of [l median(l)] is at -3 days. This means that moving from the median to the 10th percentile increases the response coe¢ cient from 0.111 to 0.264. Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix B present these estimates for BoE stock and the 3% Annuities.
Results are qualitatively similar, although the economic e¤ects are smaller than in the EIC case.
To summarize, the empirical evidence is consistent with Amsterdam price discovery a¤ecting London prices. This e¤ect does not seem to be driven by public news shocks originating in Amsterdam that are unrelated to private information. London's response to Amsterdam increases substantially after conditioning on past London price changes. This is inconsistent with independent public news shocks coming from Amsterdam. In addition, the e¤ect is signi…cantly larger when there was more time to trade in Amsterdam or when the overall time the private signal needed to "bounce o¤" was relatively short. Again, this is consistent with a feedback e¤ect of private information, but inconsistent with the arrival of public news from Amsterdam.
Robustness checks
The baseline …ndings of section 3.3 can be driven by other factors than private information. In this sub-section I discuss three alternative explanations: (1) the slipping through of public news through alternative channels, (2) the slow incorporation of public information into prices and (3) correlated liquidity shocks. Note that none of these alternative explanations can explain why co-movement between Amsterdam was stronger when the next boat was expected to arrive relatively early. Nor can they explain the feedback e¤ect of Amsterdam prices on London. However they might a¤ect the baseline estimates.
Slipping through of news
The historical record does not suggest that alternative channels through which English news could reach Amsterdam played an important role. Hope & Co for example, the most important AngloDutch bank of the period (and involved in insider trading), fully relied on the packet boat service.
Hope did not hire its own private boat to get information from England. Nevertheless, it is impossible to rule out that others did. The key question is whether the (possible) slipping through of news can fully explain the co-movement results or whether there remains a role for private information.
To answer this question I use the fact that sailing boats relied on the weather to get across the North Sea. I restrict the sample to periods where, after the arrival of a packet boat, wind conditions suddenly turned so that future packet boats were signi…cantly delayed. I assume that during these periods it was equally impossible for other boats to get across. If co-movement was purely driven by news arriving through other channels, prices should not move in the same direction in London and Amsterdam during these episodes. If there is evidence for co-movement, this would not necessarily disprove that channels other than the packet boats were used. These could still be relevant during good weather conditions. However it would indicate that private information is needed to fully explain the patterns in the data.
The potential slipping through of information is most relevant for Amsterdam non-news returns (R include the observation in bad weather sample B. I do something similar for bad weather sample C.
Here I look at the no-go zones (see …gure 7). For every day of a 2 or 3 day period, I check how many wind observations within that day (out of a total of 2 or 3) featured a no-go zone. If for every day at least 2 of these daily wind observations featured a no-go zone, I include this return in bad weather sample C.
[FIGURES 11 TO 13 ABOUT HERE] 
where I use all three di¤erent bad weather de…nitions. The interaction term between R L k and the bad weather dummy captures whether there was a di¤erent degree of co-movement during episodes of adverse weather conditions.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] Table 4 presents the corresponding results. The table shows that the degree of co-movement was equally strong in periods of bad weather -the interaction term is economically small, statistically 37 Amsterdam news returns took place right after the arrival of an o¢ cial boat and is unlikely that a non-o¢ cial boat both arrived around the same time and contained more recent information. For this to happen, the non-o¢ cial boats would have had to be faster than the o¢ cial packet boats. insigni…cant and has a positive (instead of negative) sign for two of the three bad weather de…nitions. Tables 16 and 17 in Appendix B present the same estimates for BoE stock and the 3% Annuities and results are almost identical. In table 18 in Appendix B I redo these estimations for EIC stock, calculating London returns over 2, 4 or 5 days (instead of 3 days) after the departure of a boat, using bad weather de…nition A. Again, results remain virtually the same.
To summarize, these results indicate that even under adverse weather conditions, when o¢ cial boats were unable to sail, there was still co-movement between London and Amsterdam prices. This does not conclusively rule out that public news could have reached Amsterdam through alternative channels during better weather conditions. However it does indicate that private information is needed to fully explain the patterns in the data.
Slow incorporation of public news
It is possible that co-movement is driven by the slow incorporation of public news into prices in Alternatively, it is possible that trading costs or limits to arbitrage in London are so signi…cant that (occasionally) prices do not adjust at all to re ‡ect new information (Lesmond et al. 1999; Bekaert et al. 2007 ). This would lead to zero returns. Information would be incorporated into London prices at a later point. This could potentially cause the co-movement patterns between Amsterdam and London that I document in the baseline regressions. I check whether co-movement between Amsterdam and London is stronger after zero pre-departure returns (R L k 1 ) in London. I run the following regressions for Amsterdam news and non-news returns: Tables 19 and 20 in appendix B present similar estimates for BoE stock and the 3% Annuities. For these securities there is no evidence for stronger co-movement after zero returns.
Permanent price changes or liquidity shocks?
The co-movement between Amsterdam and London could be driven by correlated liquidity shocks rather than by private information. Suppose a London agent is hit by a large liquidity shock. He may decide to split his orders between Amsterdam and London to minimize overall price impact.
As he moves down (potentially) downward sloping demand curves in both markets, prices move in the same direction. How can we di¤erentiate between this explanation and the slow revelation of private information? It is natural to assume that liquidity shocks have a transitory impact on prices (Grossman and Miller 1988) . In other words, liquidity shocks should lead to return reversals. If this drives the co-movement between Amsterdam and London, then we should observe return reversals across markets. I.e. positive (negative) price changes in London should predict subsequent negative I present these estimates in table 6. The estimates show no signi…cant predictive power. If anything, these estimates indicate the presence of return continuation or momentum (for which I correct in all estimates) rather than reversals. In other words, the evidence suggests that transitory price movements in London do not travel across the North Sea. The co-movement between Amsterdam and London re ‡ects permanent price changes rather than transitory shocks. Tables 21 and 22 in Appendix B present similar estimates for BoE stock and the 3% Annuities.
Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ect of privately informed trading on security prices, using a natural experiment from history. The results strongly support the classical Kyle (1985) model of strategic insider trading. The evidence is based on the market for British securities in Amsterdam during the 18 th century, when British securities were traded both there and in London. Anecdotal evidence suggests that London insiders traded in both markets to bene…t from privileged information. To do so, they sent letters to their agents in Amsterdam who would then trade on their behalf. Letters were sent via mail packet boats, which carried both public information and private letters. These boats only sailed twice a week, and in adverse weather they could not sail at all. As a result, Amsterdam was frequently cut o¤ from London news. I exploit these periods of exogenous market segmentation to identify the impact of private information and the strategic behavior of insiders.
To guide the empirical discussion I use a two period model based on Kyle (1985) . In the model an informed agent trades slowly over time. Price changes in both periods re ‡ect part of his signal.
The rate at which private information is incorporated into prices depends on when the agent expects the private signal to be publicly revealed.
Empirical results are consistent with the model's predictions. Price movements in Amsterdam between the arrival of boats were correlated with the contemporaneous (but as of yet unreported) returns in London. This is consistent with the presence of a private signal that is slowly incorporated into prices in both markets. The initial co-movement of Amsterdam and London prices was stronger when the next boat was expected to arrive early. This is consistent with strategic behavior on the part of the insider. The next boat would carry public news that would reveal (part of) the private signal. If the insider had less time available to bene…t from his informational advantage he would trade less aggressively early on. This accelerated price discovery.
The importance of private information is underlined by the response of London prices to price discovery in Amsterdam. Conditional on its own price discovery, the London market updated its beliefs based on price changes in Amsterdam. If due to weather conditions it took longer for a private signal to "bounce o¤" from Amsterdam, the London market responded less -by that time the private signal was already largely incorporated into London prices.
I provide evidence that the co-movement between Amsterdam and London re ‡ected permanent price changes. This means that it is unlikely that the co-movement was the result of correlated liquidity trades or other transitory shocks. Robustness checks also suggest that the results are not driven by the slow incorporation of public information into prices due to trading costs or limits to arbitrage. Finally, the arrival of news through other channels than the o¢ cial packet boats cannot account for the empirical results either.
18
th century London and Amsterdam are in many ways the perfect testing ground for models of strategic insider trading. The key strength of this speci…c historical context is that information ‡ows were less complex than today and can be perfectly reconstructed. Crucially, information arrived in a non-continuous way. This allows for a clean identi…cation of private information. There are no confounding e¤ects from other sources of information. In addition, the lengths of time over which insider information remained private in Amsterdam varied exogenously and this allows for a direct test of the strategic behavior of insiders.
Nevertheless, one might ask how general the results from this historical episode are. How crucial are the di¤erences between then and now for the interpretation of the paper's …ndings? First of all, insider trading has become illegal since the 18 th century and one might think that private information has therefore become less relevant. This does not square well with the empirical evidence for private information in today's markets (see the literature overview on page 5). In addition, …nancial markets have tremendously increased in scale and depth since the 18 th century. This would imply that today trading has become more anonymous and there might be even more opportunities for insider trading.
A second important di¤erence lies in how quickly and frequently information is transmitted. Obviously, the transmission of information was a lot slower and more infrequent in the 18 th century. The identi…cation strategy of this paper depends on these characteristics. However, private information itself, the thing that we fundamentally care about, was not the result of primitive communication technology. Rather it was the result of London insiders having access to superior sources of information. This is similar to today where corporate insiders are likely to be better informed than the market as a whole.
Thirdly, the results of this paper are consistent with long-lived private information (I estimate that it took two weeks for a given signal to be incorporated into prices) and with insiders having (Bai et al. 2012 ). This suggests that long lived private information, held by monopolistic agents, is as relevant today as it ever was. 38 Either private information was held by a single insider (Kyle 1985) or multiple insiders observed di¤erent signals (Foster and Viswanathan 1996) . Expected arrival of next boat estimated by adding the median sailing time to the date a boat was scheduled to depart. The vertical black line indicates the unconditionally expected time until the next boat arrival of 3.5 days. If the empirical model has a perfect fit, we would expect all group 1 observations to be still at risk at 3.5 days, and all group 2 observations to have failed at 3.5 days. If the empirical model has a perfect fit, we would expect all group 1 observations to be still at risk at 3.5 days, and all group 2 observations to have failed at 3.5 days. Tables   Table 1: Co-movement Chi 2 test is performed on the equality of the R L k coe¢ cients in columns (1) and (2). ***,** denotes statistical signi…cance at the 1, 5% level. Robust, bootstrapped standard errors (1000 replications) are reported in parentheses. stronger if past London returns (pre-departure returns R L k 1 = 0) had been zero. This proxies for situations where trading costs or limits to arbitrage led to a delay in the incorporation of public information into prices (Lesmond et al 1999) .
See …gure 4 for exact de…nitions of returns. London post-departure returns are calculated over three days after a boat departure. ***, * denotes statistical signi…cance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Robust, bootstrapped standard errors (1000 replications) are reported in parentheses. Adj. R 2 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Estimates of regressions predicting future Amsterdam returns based on London returns.
The London return is de…ned as the London pre-departure return (R L k 1 , see …gure 4). The Amsterdam return is calculated as the price change after the arrival of the boat that brings this information and the Amsterdam price T days into the future (p A k+T p A k;t=1 ). T varies between 2-3 days and 4 weeks. Robust, bootstrapped (1000 reps) standard errors in parentheses.
* indicates statistical signi…cance at the 10% level
